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In recent years, the call for better firearms control has been strongly
driven by shocking murders that have alarmed the Canadian public. The
Firearms Act' was adopted in a political climate of controversy and
confrontation between pressure groups with opposing viewpoints. On one
hand, the reaction of women to the horrible tragedy at the Ecole
Polytechnique gave rise to the movement for increased firearm control, and
resulted in a petition for a radical ban on firearms being signed by an
unprecedented number of Canadians. This was followed by active and
continuous efforts in favour of a new FirearmsA ct.2 On the other hand, rich
firearms dealers, avid collectors, farm and sport hunters (some of whom are
poachers), banded together to defend their freedom of expression and the
right to own firearms, describing these weapons as merely inanimate
objects.
I Bill C-68,AnAct Respecting Firearms and Other Weapons, Ist Sess., 35th Parl., Ottawa, 1995 (1st
reading 14 February 1995).
2 Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39 (assented to 5 December 1997); See also Department of Justice,
Background Infonnation on Firearms Control (Ottawa, Department of Justice) [hereinafter Background
Informationl.
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Much to the disappointment of the "anti-firearms lobby," then
Minister of Justice Allan Rock presented a bill that did not ban
commercially-sold weapons that are not sports-related. He also endorsed
one of the arguments of the "pro-firearms lobby" by proposing a bill that
sought to severely punish violent criminals committing crimesvith firearms,
but did not target peaceful owners of firearms.
This article reflects on the apparent contradiction between
supporting a total ban on firearms in Canada, while opposing the tougher
sentences set out in the Fireanns Act.' Regardless of how they may appear,
the arguments that follow relate as much to ideology as they do to law.
I. A POSITION OF PRINCIPLE: FROM PERSONAL
EXPERIENCE TO DEEP-SEATED CONVICTION
To help the reader better understand how my personal experience
has shaped my thinking, I should state from the outset that the tragedy at
the Ecole Polytechnique hit close enough to home, such that I consider
myself a deeply-affected witness of the events. As Dean of the Faculty of
Law at the Universit6 de Montreal at the time of the shootings, and an
official participant in the academic follow-up to the event, it would be an
understatement to say that I was haunted by the fear and grief of the
survivors and the victims' loved ones. I was also deeply upset to learn that
the daughter of a friend of mine and the sister of one of my law students
had been among the victims. My belief that we urgently need to disarm
Canadians and fight to ban firearms in Canada, indeed all weapons that
cannot be categorized as collectors' items or for "sport," partly stems from
this horrible incident
A. Fear Management by Parliament
It is often said that fear is a bad counsellor. As fear greatly clouds
any rational examination of reality, it should not be the driving force behind
our criminal laws. Feelings of fear and insecurity on the part of Canadians,
have been significant factors in setting standards of criminal law in the
3 See especiallyCriminal Cede, R.S.C. 19S5, c. C-46, 1 220,36,239, 24,272-73 271).274 b 344
346.
4 Without hesitating. I signed the Canada-v.ide rctttion on Itter firearm control that circulatcd
after the Polytechnique shootings.
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latter years of this century.' However, those who must ensure the protection
of Canadians should not allow fear to cloud their judgment. Experiencing
fear and confusion when faced with serious problems in society is
completely natural, and allows the legislator to empathize with the
Canadian public. However, this does not remove the legislator's obligation
to choose and develop criminal laws that are most likely to ensure peace,
security, tolerance, and justice in Canadian society. Faced with mass
distress, the legislator should not lose sight of the political and democratic
responsibility to direct legislative solutions towards a more peaceful and
just society, but draw on the expertise available in a well-organized state
governed by the rule of law.
The idea that imposing minimum sentences for serious criminal
offences might reduce violent crime constitutes a questionable handling of
feelings of insecurity in the Canadian public on the part of the lawmakers.
While a greater control of firearms is a better strategic means to promote
the development of a peaceful society, increasing the severity of
punishments does not guarantee us a more peaceful society.
As we look back on the criminal laws adopted in the 1980s and
1990s, we see that to better control violent crime, particularly violence
against women and children, the state chose to use the most violent weapon
in its arsenal: punitive law in its most severe form. I am not, in any way,
claiming that harm done to the human body and mind is not an important
issue. It is, indeed, right to demand that criminal law address all types of
violence that have formerly been tolerated or deliberately ignored.
Emerging rhetoric on fundamental rights has undeniably led Canadians to
become more interested in seeking better protection of their personal and
public safety. However, this interest has resulted in an irrational increase
of their fear and insecurity, and a decrease in their concern for liberty,
tolerance, and justice. The government has documented studies on the
Canadian public's misperception of the extent of violent crime in Canada,'
"5 Department of Justice, Towards Safer Communities: A Progress Report on the Safe Homes, Safe
Streets Agenda (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1995) [hereinafter Towards Safer Communities). The
introduction states at 1: "The Government was elected by Canadians in 1993, in part because of its
pledge to protect the basic rights of all citizens to live in peaceful and safe communities. That pledge
included action on gun control, young offenders, hate crime, and violence against women and children."
6 See NationalAttitudes Towards Crime and Gun Control: A Research Report for the Ministry ofthe
Solicitor General of Canada, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1997); J. Roberts, "Public Opinion,
Crime and Criminal Justice," in M. Tonry, ed., Crime and Justice, A Review of Research, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992) vol. 16; K. Hung & S. Bowles, "Public Perceptions of Crime" (1995)
15:1 Juristat I at 2ff [hereinafter "Public Perceptions"]; Report of the Canadian Sentencing
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a misperception that leads many to call for criminal laws with teeth.
Nevertheless, despite their knowledge of the extent of violent crime in
Canada and especially of the inaccurate nature of the Canadian public's
perception of the issue, legislators did not hesitate to pass laws based on the
feelings of intolerance and fear that were founded on these misperceptions.
How can our criminal laws better reflect the public's concern for
safety, while promoting their desire for a democratic society based on
peace, liberty, tolerance and justice? To accomplish this goal, legislators
and the Canadian public as a whole, should try to apply more reason than
fear in developing criminal law:.-infrastructure for safety. They must
recognize the symbolic and political power of criminal laws, and determine
the effectiveness of each punitive measure is in terms of securing personal
and public safety. Finally, legislators must always choose the solutions that
vill result in a peaceful, free, tolerant, and just society.
B. The Symbolic Power of Criminal Laws is Sometimes Enough
The relatively short-term efficiency of the new Firearms Act can be
criticized, specifically its limited ability to immediately change the attitude
of firearm owners. However, what we need to focus on is the new law's
symbolic power.7
Firearms are themselves highly symbolic. They evoke strength and
power in those, usually men, who posses them. Firearms give the owner
control over a supposedly hostile environment, present in nature, the city
or people, and are even considered a natural extension of the human arm,
to the point where some claim gun ownership as a right. When not wielded
by a human being, they are seen as inherently harmless. In short, a stricter
law on the possession and use of firearms would seek to address all of these
symbols.:
The law challenges these symbols by stating the following:
possession of a firearm is not natural; firearms are not needed for safety or
defence against a supposedly hostile environment; possession of a firearm
is a privilege, not a right; a firearm is a dangerous object. My support for a
Commission, Sentencing Refom: A Canadian Appreach (Ottava: Supply and Services Canada, 1937)
at 37ff [hereinafter Ardamrbault Rponl; See also D.Golash & J. Lnch, "Publie Opinion, Crime
Seriousness, and Sentencing Policy" (1995) 22 Am. J. Crim. L 702
7 N. Boyd, "Bill C-6S: Simple Problem, Comple\ Solutions" (1995) 37 Can. J. Cnm.214 at 2161s.
See H. Buckner, -Sex and Guns: Is Gun Control Male Control" (S9th annual American
Sociological Association conference on Deviance and Control, 5 August 1994. online. H Buckner
website <http:li www .btuckner.com> (date accessed: 25 January 2002).
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stricter firearm law is largely based on my rejection of all symbols that have
traditionally been linked to firearms. The Canadian legislation on firearms
is the bearer of new symbols. For example, it inscribes in law the fact that
unlike Americans, Canadians can live without firearms.9
When I re-examine my passing fear to determine if it was an
imprudent influence in leading me to promote a Canadian law prohibiting
all military and para-military weapons, and handguns, I deduce that it
simply directed my interest toward the "disarmament" of Canadians.
Rather, my desire for tolerance and peace is what drives my support for a
stricter firearm law. Creating a society without weapons, at least with
considerably fewer weapons, is a more tangible way of attaining peace in
our society and cultivating tolerance among the Canadian population."0 Is
tolerance not a quality that we like to think of as being distinctly Canadian?
Why then, if we are so tolerant, do we have to own firearms?
C. The Creation of a Feminist and Tolerant Opinion
Some of my reflections on fear, tolerance, and peace also take me
back to the main elements of my feminist vision of criminal law. Much
feminist legal literature demonstrates that, for women, in addition to the
fear of crime and violence, there is also a fear of being mistreated by the
judicial system." For example, Canadian feminism has contributed
considerably to changing the legal rules on reprehensible human conduct
in the private and public domains, as well as politicizing violent acts that
previously went unpunished. One need only think of the numerous
9 According to information collected by the Coalition for Gun Control, the rate of homicides not
involving the use of a firearm is slightly higher in the United States than in Canada (1.7 times), but is
ten times higher in homicides involving a firearm. On this subject see M. Killias, "International
Correlations Between Gun Ownership and Rates of Homicide and Suicide" (1993) 148 Can. Mcd.
Assoc. J. 1721; P.J. Cook, "The Effect of Gun Availability on Violent Crime Patterns" (1981) 455 The
Annals 63; A. Kellerman et al., "Gun Ownership as a Real Factor for Homicide in the Home" (1993)
329 New Eng. J. Med. 1084.
10 R. MacLellan, "Canada's Firearms Proposals" (1995) 37 Can. J. Crim. at 173-74.
1A National Symposium on Women, Law and the Administration of Justice (Ottawa: Supply and
Services Canada, 1992); Department of Justice, Gender Equality in the Canadian Justice System:
Summary Document and Proposals for Action (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1992); E.
Adelberg & C. Currie, In Conflict with the Law: Women and the Canadian Justice System, (Vancouver:
Press Gang, 1993).
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debates 2 on spousal, child and sexual abuse, pornography, prostitution and
sexual harassment, to realize the enormous influence that the feminist
movement has had on these issues. Sexual exploitation and violence
committed against women and children have become highly political issues.
For example, the feminist perspective has sufficiently influenced the
perspective of Canadians, leading many to accept that Marc LUpine, the
Polytechnique killer, committed political murders. By targeting fourteen
women and none of the men present at the time of the massacre, this
violent man, a student in a stereotypically male environment, was the
essence of all the individual and collective objections towards legal and
policy changes on gender equality. 3
The government addressed many requests for more concrete legal
protection of victims of abuse and violence by supporting new criminal
laws." It also facilitated criminal prosecution by making criminal law a
better tool in condemning the many acts of violence committed against
women and children. 5 It has therefore begun to tap into the symbolic
power and strength of criminal laws, so that reprehensible behaviour is no
longer tolerated. In this painstaking job of condemning injustices toward
women and children, lawmakers quickly came to believe that, for justice to
be served in these cases, more severe punishments were needed.
There is currently a parallel in criminal legislation betveen the
suppression of spousal and family abuse and the sexual exploitation of
women and children, and the renewed interest in the death penalty,
12 Report ofzthe Committee on Seaal OffencesAgaint Chldren and 1cduds, o1 2, (Ottawa; Supply
and Services Canada, 1984) (Chair R.F. Badglcy); Report of the Spccial Commnittee on Pewrraplrand
Prostitution, vol. 2, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1985) (Chair P. Fra.er).
13 T.Wills, "Guns are a Phallic Symbol: Female MPs' The [MontrcalJ Gazete (27 March 1991)
BI; House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings arid Evidence of the Standing Committee en Justce and
Solicitor General (10 June 1992) at 67-44-67,46 (The Honourable Mary Collins).
14 See especially Bill C- 27, An Act to amend tie Cnrmnal Code in redatian to sa.rual offences, S.C.
1980-S1-82-S3, c. 125; Bill C-49,An Act to amend die Criminal Cede (saw.alassalt). S.C. 1992, C 33;
Bill C-15,An Act to amend the Criminal Cede and the Canada EvidenceAct, R.S.C. 1935 (3d Supp.),c.
19.
15 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Canadian Crne Statistes 1992, (Ottaa. Statistics
Canada, 1994) at 25-26. While witnessing an increase in% iolent crime rates in Canada betv.een 1977 and
1991, the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics %,.itnessed a drop in this rate beginning in 1992 and
warned against interpreting statistics on this particular point by correlating t'.o verydifferent rcahttes:
the actual rate of violent crime incidents in Canada and the actual rate of reported cases that, if it
increased, was due to policies promoting reporting of such incidents. See ibid at 16 v,here it is stated,
"Recent increases in violent crime may partially be due to heightened public awareness and reduced
tolerance of violence, and thus an increased propensity to report such crimes." See also D. Hendnck,
"Canadian Crime Statistics, 1994" (1995) 15:12Junstat 1,
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lengthening prison terms, eliminating parole and criminal dangerousness,
getting tough on young offenders, providing for permanent supervision of
ex-offenders, and the universal and perpetual monitoring of sex offenders. 6
Our present laws present somewhat of a paradox: at the dawn of the
millenium, Canadian criminal legislation is more effectively addressing
concerns for protecting women and children through criminal laws that are
less humane and less humanistic. In fact, parliament is telling us that better
protection of women and children through criminal law flows from an
ideology of resentment. Moreover, legal feminism is demanding draconian
criminal laws that would make up for the impunity previously engendered
by past abusers through the extreme punishment of future abusers.
In the new punitive measures outlined in the Firearms Act,
particularly those imposing minimum sentences of four years for the use of
a firearm in the commission of a serious criminal offence, lawmakers claim
that an objective of the law is to provide tougher tools to combat violence
in society. Because this political issue can be easily associated with what
feminists condemn, the legislator would have us believe that these punitive
measures are inspired by feminist demands for tougher criminal laws to
counter violent crime. 7 However, the impetus for these particular
punishments comes chiefly from the influence of the firearms lobby on
criminal law, the right-wing ideology of the "Reform Party," and the
electioneering opportunism of the party in power. 8 In keeping with its
humanistic and humanizing potential, legal feminism must move away
from an ideology of resentment when it comes to influencing the
development of criminal laws.
Canadian feminists have learned numerous lessons from the
historical condition of women, allowing them to make a sound case for a
different prescriptive development in Canadian criminal law. This collective
experience should also motivate them to promote more humane punitive
practices, to develop a more humanistic approach to crime control and
16 Towards Safer Communities, supra note 5.
1 7 Background Information,supra note 2 at I. It is interesting to note that minimum sentences are
the first control measures stated; B. Cox, "Tough Gun Law Needed to Protect Women: Minister," The
[Montreal] Gazette (5 December 1990) BI.
18 According to Wendy Sukler, the Coalition for gun control did not suggest minimum sentences
in its militant action: W. Sukler, "Workshop on Policy for Gun Control in Canada: Impact and Prospects
of the 1995 Reform" (Annual Conference of the Canadian Association of Law Teachers, Brock
University, June 1996) [unpublished].
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punishment, and to promote gentler, more positive strategies likely to
decrease violence in society.19
If we look back on the historical role of women, we find that the
roots of feminist thinking support crime control that is relatively more
moderate and humane. Women must apply the lessons learned from their
historical powerlessness and change their view of punishment to give crime
control a different face. In fact, history shows that as peacemakers at home
and in private life, women were generally deprived of any public role,
including that of going to war.
Though unacceptable, this historical situation nevertheless allowed
women ample opportunity to see the benefits of forgiveness, reconciliation,
and redress in maintaining harmonious relationships, despite the
disadvantages and the inequality of their subordinate role in private life.
They have also seen the repercussions of a just war-killing their husbands
and sons, raping themselves and their daughters-and the painful
compromises and dissatisfactions of an often imperfect peace. Why then,
based on this long experience of the significant merits of forgiveness,
reconciliation and peace, would women not develop a political mindset in
favour of promoting forgiveness, reconciliation and restoring peace in the
application of crime control and punishment? Why wouldn't they suggest
alternative solutions to violence in society?
We can imagine punishment that goes beyond resentment towards
a criminal and his crime, by making some allowance for forgiveness and
reconciliation, and by favouring the development of a restorative and
peaceful justice. The lessons learned from the history of women can also
teach us to foster the development of a peaceful, free, tolerant, and just
society. Excessive punishment paves the way for an ideology of resentment,
which should not be associated with humane and tolerant feminism.
II. A LEGAL POSITION: FROM THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF MINIMUM SENTENCES TO
THEIR DISPUTABLE IMPLEMENTATION
In re-examining firearm legislation, legislators decided to apply a
minimum sentence of four years to approximately ten serious Criminal
19 In an interesting article on the idea that feminists should only use law to reach certain goals
based on clearly specified conditions, the author suggests some pitfalls to avoid and alternatives to
criminal law that can truly impact the lives of women. See L Snider, "Feminism, Punishment and the
Potential of EmpowermenC' (1994) 9:1 Can. J. L & Society 75.
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Code offences when committed with a firearm, in situations in which these
same offences may otherwise have different maximum sentences.2"
We can already predict that the constitutionality of these new
minimum sentences will soon be challenged. The following constitutional
and systemic analysis aims to show that these sentences are cruel, unjust,
and ineffective in controlling violent crime. They constitute a repressive
solution that does not advance Canadian society towards peace, liberty,
tolerance, and justice. In this regard, punishment does more harm than
good and opens the door to arbitrary applications.2
For the sake of argument, I will use the new punitive measures for
manslaughter to illustrate my view. The new section 236 of the Criminal
Code states:
Every person who commits manslaughter is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
(a) where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life and
to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; and
(b) in any other case, to imprisonment for life.
Manslaughter actually covers a very large range of reprehensible
acts causing death. Indeed, this offence can range from accidental death to
near murder. 2 Moreover, according to a survey of 400,000 sentencing
decisions handed down between 1991 and 1992 in Canada, 80 per cent of
homicide sentences vary between thirty days and eleven years, for an
average of four years.'
20
Criminal Code, supra note 3. See especially ss. 224, 272 (maximum of fourteen years) and ss,
236, 239, 273, 279, 279.1, 344 and 346 (maximum of life). Parliament imposes the same minimum
sentence for two sexual assault offences of different severity (ss. 272, 273), and states that infliction of
bodily harm with a weapon should result in as harsh a sentence as homicide with a weapon.
21 For an article voicing the same opinion, see P. Landreville, "Peine minimum A sdv6rit6
maximum" Le Devoir (23 December 1994) A11.
22 R. v. Cascoe (1970), 54 Cr. App. R. 401, cited in the Archambault Report, supra note 6 at 519-
520: "[M]anslaughter is of course a crime which varies very greatly in its seriousness. It may sometimes
come very close to inadvertence. That is one end of the scale. At the other end of the scale, it may
sometimes come very close to murder." The Commission also cites R. v. Gregor (1953), 31 M.P.R. 99
(C.S.N.R.): "There are certain cases of manslaughter where the line between crime and accident is
narrow.... For an example of near-murder, see . v. MacDonald (1974), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 144 (C.A.
Ont).
23 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Sentencing in Adult Provincial Courts. A Study of Six
Jurisdictions, 1991 and 1992, (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1993) at 17 (Figure 8).
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A. Cruel and Unusual Punishient
By stating that manslaughter committed with a firearm is objectively
more serious than any other form of homicide without a firearm, the new
legislation makes a categorical judgement. In homicide cases where
circumstances would otherwise lead a judge to impose a prison sentence of
considerably less than four years, the judge may not have the opportunity
to examine the concrete severity of the offence or the actual degree of fault
of its perpetrator. Nevertheless, this sentencing can still take place when
the homicide did not involve a firearm.
1. Excessive disproportion
Sentencing ease law on homicide contains several examples where
a much lighter sentence than the new legislated minimum was imposed by
taking into account the exceptional mitigating circumstances and by
applying the general principles of sentencing.2' For the various offences
with the new minimum sentence it is not difficult to identify and imagine
situations where offenders could have received a less severe sentence in the
past.
The arguments used to determine the unconstitutionality of the
minimum sentence in the Smith ' case can be applied here. Punitive excess
is inherent in the law because the mandatory and inflexible legislated
sentence may have a clearly exaggerated, disproportionate, and completely
unwarranted effect on the offender, whose act does not require punitive
condemnation of this severity.'
24 SeeR. v.MacKay (19S0),40N.S.R. (2d) 616 (CA. ,Attom 'Gcneralofuct~v.Rab.o (1934).
39 C.R. (3d) 67 (Qc. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Hardy (1976), 33 C.R.N.S. 76 (Qe. Sup. Ct.),
251. v. Smith (Edward Dewe',), [1987) 1 S.C.R. 1045 [hereinafter Smith].
26 Ibid. at 1OSO, per Mr. Justice Lamer. Even by following Mr. Justice Gonthier's reasning nR.
v. Goltz, [199113 S.C.R.4S5 at 490-521 [hereinafter Goktz], %e an easily find reasonable and citwinr ing
hypothetical cases forwhich this sentence is too long. In a recent case at the Supreme Court of No'a
Scotia, Judge Scalan invalidated, based on s. 12 of the Chater, the four-ear minimum santence for
criminal negligence causing death. See R. v. Afrris-y, (1996) 3 C.R. (5th) 301 S.C, afi'd (19?7) 169
N.S.R. (2d) 13 (S.C.), rev'd (199S) 167 NS.R. (2d) 43 (C.A.) [hereinafter Moms,, tCA,], The trial
judge analyzed hypothetical situations by keeping in mind that a court cannot imaltdate lgt-latton by
referring to unrealistic and farfetched applications, and he statesat 312;"As inSndh, I am Fatrsficd that
it is inevitable that this minimum sentence provision isgoing to cast such a v. ide net that i-op!e V.tll te
caught by that net where the punishment of four y ears would indeed be cruel and unusual ha n, regard
to the circumstances of the accused and the offence."
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2. Affront to human dignity and the impact on collective conscience
While it is legally easier to use an unconstitutionality test to
demonstrate the exaggerated disproportion of the new minimum sentences
by carrying out a contextual analysis of the application of the legislation to
homicide cases and by observing sentencing in the Canadian courts, it is
more difficult to contend that all homicides committed with a firearm,
including the less reprehensible ones, should not be punished by a four-year
prison term. In other words, nothing stops the legislator from applying
different standards of severity to crimes committed in Canada. Lawmakers
could also claim that they are simply keeping pace with the values of
Canadians by addressing violent crime with greater rigour and
determination.27 They could state that the new four-year minimum is now
proportional to the severity officially set out for all serious Criminal Code
offences committed with a firearm. This would reflect an increased
condemnation of violent crime in Canada. Canadians may even complain
that punishments for violent crime are currently greater than the four-year
minimum.' Consequently, this sentence would not constitute an affront to
human dignity or offend public decency, even in a less blameworthy case of
homicide.
If public opinion is to dictate whether the length of a prison term
is an affront to public decency or human dignity, then the Charter's9 role
as a fundamental legal tool to promote a higher standard of public decency
and human dignity risks being compromised. In this regard, the shocking,
indecent or degrading nature of a sentence must be demonstrated in
another way. The law is indecent when it has erratic or tyrannical effects on
people. While it is necessary to measure the affront of a minimum sentence
against a standard of public decency, it is also appropriate to consider
whether the legislator's lawmaking is exceptional and exorbitant, as
compared to its usual approach in determining the seriousness of crimes.
If the lawmaking is exceptional, does it address problems that have become
exceptional in scope? In a democracy, legislating by exception can
27 Towards Safer Communities, supra note 5; Department of Justice, Consideration of the
Department of Justice Outlook on Program Priorities and Expenditures from 1995 to 1998, (Ottawa:
Ministry of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1995).
28 "Public Perceptions," supra note 6; Background Information, supra note 2: "Deterrence and
longer sentences are the main firearm control measures and reflect the importance Canadians give to
public safety." [translation by author].
29 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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constitute an affront to public decency if it becomes a regular instrument
of control. Under the rule of law, the barometer used to determine whether
a minimum sentence of fouryears constitutes an excessive punishment that
shocks our collective conscience has to be based on our democratic
lavanaking practices, and not on the intuitions, impressions, and emotions
of Canadians."
Since codification of the criminal law in 1892, our lawmaking
tradition has been to express the objective and relative seriousness of
crimes in terms of maximum prison sentences of a certain number of
years.31 In this way, we Imow that homicide is more serious than theft, and
that homicide and attempted murder, aggravated theft, and drug trafficking
are in the same category of gravity because the legislation prescribes the
same maximum sentence for them.
Traditionally in Canada, we have relied little on minium sentences.
Indeed, minimum sentences have faced constitutional challenges precisely
because they are unusual3 2 They are widely criticized in texts on sentencing
reform33 and are not very popular with prosecutors or defense attorneys
alike. Lastly, the legislator recognizes the unusual nature of minimum
sentences by declaring that when in doubt, all legislation referring to a
prison term must be interpreted as a maximum, not a minimum sentence,
The legislator not only breaks with normal practice by resorting to
minimum sentences, but also prescribes the same minimum sentence of
four years to offences of different gravity that are not all punishable by the
same maximum sentence. In this respect, the legislator abandons the idea
of gradually increasing the severity of a sentence with the seriousness of the
30_ -
Smith,supra note 25 at 1074 (perJusriceLamer), 1037 (perJustice Nlcntyrc) Kumdlerv. Canada
(Minister of Justice), [19911 2 S.C.R. 779 at 791 (per Justice Sopinka), ,32 (pe.r Justtce LaForest)
[hereinafterlnder];R. v. Burlinglzamn, [19951 2S.C.R, 20 at 2Sq-S9(pcrJuitce Sopmka); R+v. Co!Mtns,
[1987J 1 S.C.R. 265 at 281-S2 (per Justice Lamer).
31 The legislator prefers the following maximums: 6 months, 1, 2, 5, 10 or 14 year& For general
information, se H. Dumont, Pinologie- LeDroit Candicn Rclattf atm:Peines eatScntences, (tMontreal:
Thdmis publishing, 1995) at 152,216-23,231.
3 2 Smith,supra note 25; Goltzsupra note 26;R., v.Parons (19S), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 798jR v.Kns,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 255.
33Archambault Report, supra note 6 at IS9-90; Canadian Committee on CorreettonsToward Unit)
Criminal Justice and Corrections by R. Ouimet (Ottatwa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 226 [hereinafter
Ouimet]. The report argues that minimum sentences should be abolished: "[Mlimmum mandatory
sentences in casesother than murder constitute an unrarrantcd restriction on the sentencingdtsisetion
of the court."
34 Criminal Code, supra note 3, s, 718.3(2).
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harm.35 The minimum sentence goes against the very way in which the
Criminal Code expresses the relative gravity of offences and constitutes a
punitive measure that amounts to legislating by exception.
In any case, the immoderate severity of minimum sentences must
be assessed using a barometer that gauges the degree of punishment in a
more concrete and less impressionistic way than supposed public demands
for tougher punishments. In an article entitled "Underpunishing Offenders:
Towards a Theory of Legal Tolerance,"3 6 criminologists Peter Tremblay,
Gilbert Cordeau and Marc Ouimet present sentencing data studies by
comparing the "demand" for punishment (as expressed by the public) to
the "supply" (as expressed by court officers). Their results show that court
officials as a whole are less punishment-oriented than the general public.
This support for lighter sentences by court officials may stem from the fact
that the officials are players in the justice system while as a spectator the
public is more strongly convinced of the effectiveness of sentences. Their
firm belief that punishment works along with the lack of first-hand
knowledge of its true limited effectiveness, may be the determining factors
that lead citizens to seek tougher sentences. The legislator does not have
to exploit this call for greater punishment by disregarding everything that
is known about the social and economic ill effects of severe sentences and
the uncertainty of proper application in the administration of criminal
justice.
It should also be noted that the willingness to punish varies
depending on whether a person has knowledge of a case through direct
participation in the administration of justice, as a juror, for example, or
learns of a case from media coverage. As Justice Cory emphasized in
Kindler,37 history tells of many cases where the jury displayed compassion,
clemency, and humanity to avoid sentencing the criminal too harshly. Ajury
of laypersons does not necessarily demand the same severity of punishment
as the general public, nor does it tend to condemn as quickly.
The excessive severity of minimum sentences of four years is also
evidenced by the fact that lawmakers were not reacting to a wave of violent
crime. Nor were they addressing a social issue that had taken on disastrous
proportions. In fact, the Canadian legislator's choice to impose minimum
sentences is not justified by the statistics on violent crime. In the last few
3 5 Supra note 20.
36 P. Tremblay, G. Cordeau & M. Ouimet, "Underpunishing Offenders: Towards a Theory of
Legal Tolerance" (1994) 36 Can. J. Crim. 407.
37 Kindler, supra note 29 at 804.
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years, violent crime constituted approximately ten percent of reported
crime. Since 1992, rate of reported crime has dipped, while the rate of
incarceration has continued to skyrocket.3  Although the application of
minimum sentences may be limited to a "small" sample of crimes, they will
have the undesirable result of increasing the rate of incarceration and of
exacerbating prison overpopulation?'
In the final analysis, Canadian Iavnakers respond to criticism by
claiming that their punitive choice is a highly moral one that is reflective of
an increase in the collective consciousness of Canadians. However, there
are no good moral bases to justify the recent level of punishment prescribed
in Canadian society!' When in doubt, we should demand that the law
impose as little punishment as possible. An evolving standard of collective
consciousness or public decency is seen as a reflection of the progress of a
civilization. It is inexcusable that society should approve of, or develop,
punishments that are increasing in severity. Interpretation of section 12 of
the Charter must not lead to this result. Minimum sentences have the
potential for being cruel. On a moral level, Canadian society should do
without them.
B. An Unjust Sentence
TheArchambaultReport was particularly insightful in shedding light
on the injustice of minimum sentences and on their incompatibilitywith the
fundamental principles of proportionality between offences and sentences,
and equality among offenders 4
36M. Reed,"Correctional Services in Canada: Highlights for 1993-94"(1995) 15"5Iuriat 1 at 1.
2,11.
39 Department of Justice, Low-risk Offenders (Ottax a, Department of Justice): -The federal
inmate population increased by about 22 per cent from IS90 to 1995. and if current trends continue,
it will increase another 50 per cent in the next ten years"
40
N. Christie, Limits to Pain, (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1932).
41Archambault Report, supra note 6 at 186:
[P]rinciplesof proportionality and cquityshould furtherguide thejudge mn determiingajus
disposition in the particular case before the court. At this level. each criminal offence is
uniquely defined by its own set of circumstahccs and the notion of a judge pre-determining
a sentence before hearing the facts seems abhorrent to our nottons of justice. If the
punishment is to fit the crime, then there can be no pre.determined sentences nce criminal
events are not themselves pre-determincd. Although the offence should be the focus in
determining the appropriate penalty, the circumstances of the offender must also ha% e some
weight ... Absolute uniformity of impact may necer be perfectly attained -the punishment
may never be truly commensurate wvith the seriousness of the offence and blammorthineF5
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Precedents from the Supreme Court indicate that the principle of
proportionality is a constitutional obligation, and may even constitute a
fundamental principle of justice. 2 The unconstitutionality of the minimum
sentence of four years can also be illustrated by an argument based on
section 7 of the Charter.43
1. Just proportionality
The observance of just proportionality as a principle of justice
would imply that homicide legislation, for example, be drafted to be
consistent with the principle of proportionality. Let us examine in greater
detail the principle of proportionality of offences and sentences as it applies
to the new manslaughter legislation and take a concrete example to
determine if the minimum sentence of four years challenges the
constitutional principle of proportionality.
Although it cannot be applied to all homicides committed with a
firearm, criminology literature and criminal cases identify the psychological
traits of offenders who cause death with a firearm. The traits tend to reflect
of the offender. There are too many variables for that to happen, but it is a goal to which this
Commission is committed and which mandatory minima militate against.
42 R. v. M. (C.A.), (19961 1 S.C.R. 500 at 529 [hereinafterM. (CA.)]: "It is a well- established tenet
of our criminal law that the quantum of sentence imposed should be broadly commensurate with the
gravity of the offence committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender." In this decision,
Justice Lamer makes a point of relating this point of view to the protection offered by s, 12 of the
Charter in order to avoid too easily assuming that all disproportional or excessive sentences are
unconstitutional. However, it is by recognizing the fundamental principle of proportionality that we can
ultimately identify an exaggerated sentence. There are other passages from rulings that identify the
inextricable connection between the fundamental principle of proportionality set out in s. 7 and that of
the excessiveness of the sentence under s. 12 of the Charter. See especially Smith, supra note 25 at 1074,
per Justice Lamer: "The notion that there must be a gradation of punishments according to the
malignity of offences may be considered to be a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7, but, given
my decision under s. 12, 1 do not find it necessary to deal with that issue here."
See also Re B.C. Motor VehicleAct, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 532-33, per Justice Wilson:
While the legislature may as a matter of government policy make this an offence, and we
cannot question its wisdom in this regard, the question is whether it can make it mandatory
for the courts to deprive a person convicted of it of his liberty without violating s. 7. This, in
turn, depends on whether attaching a mandatory term of imprisonment to an absolute
liability offence such as this violates the principles of fundamental justice. I believe that it
does. I think the conscience of the court would be shocked and the administration of justice
brought into disrepute by such an unreasonable and extravagant penalty. It is totally
disproportionate to the offence and quite incompatible with the objective of a penal system
... to keep punishment to the minimum necessary to achieve the objectives of the system.
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less moral turpitude than those of offenders who kill with a knife."
Homicide committed with a firearm can be impulsive, spontaneous, barely
intentional or unintentional, and unpremeditated. Homicidevith a firearm
could be considered relatively less involved, because it implies a quickness
of action, and can be committed without physical contact between the
assailant and victim. An example is when an offender acts through a
momentary loss of self-control. Homicide through another means, such as
the use of a knife or bare fists, may be more violent, implying greater malice
on the part of the attacker, and greater indifference to the victim's suffering
before death.4
Therefore, in determining the sentence, a judge will want to
distinguish betveen the two types of homicide, by reflecting the different
degrees of guilt and moral turpitude on the part of the tvo offenders.
Without the minimum sentence, the judge is able to punish the homicide
committed with a knife more severely than the homicide committed with
a firearm. With the new legislation, the firearm homicide will be punished
in every instance by four years of imprisonment, whereas a less severe
sentence could be imposed for the homicide committed with a knife.
This example reveals the legislation's intent. It shows that the law
disapproves most of the means used to commit the crime. At sentencing,
courts can no longer take the offender's true degree of moral culpability
into account in determining a fair sentence." In other words, the legislator
creates a new rule of proportionality, whereby the means used to commit
a homicide results in a four-year term, irrespective of the offender's degree
of moral culpability.
As an alternative to this method of sentencing, judges and
legislators could say that committing a crime with a weapon constitutes an
44 See, eg.,,acKay, supra note 24 (suspended sentence for homicide Vith a gun); . . TrenchfiWd
(1978), (1979)9 CR. (3d) S-1 (Ont. S.C.) (six years for homicide v, ith a lnifc);Z vft c r, (191J), 4
W.C.B. 333 (Ont. CA.) (sixyears for homicide caused bybeating). See alsoMemsy (C44. sutra note
26.
45 See the numerous decisions cited in C.C. Ruby, Scntcncing, 3d ed (Toronto, Butternorths,
1987) at 409423.
46 The principle of proportionality (a fundamental principle) also recetcs legilatie sancton in
the new -entencinglegislation, aforementioned,upra note 43; see CrimninalCcJe,,vupra note 3s. 718.1.
The fact that, in two distinct laws passed at almost the same time, the legislator contributes to the
principle of proportionality and breaches the same pnnciple by creating minimum sentences of four
years is questionable.
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aggravating circumstance.47 It is hard to understand why lawmakers did not
choose this legislative technique. This option would certainly have complied
with the principle of proportionality. In this regard, constitutional case law
amply supports the argument that minimum sentences are unjust and
violate section 7 of the Charter.
The Supreme Court rejected the legislative attempt to upgrade a
homicide to murder if it was perpetrated during the commission of a
serious offence on the ground that it would allow an offender to be
sentenced to a minimum of life without requiring proof of the perpetrator's
subjective foresight of death.48 This legislation would have excessively
punished those who involuntarily caused death, even if the act involved
aggravating circumstances, such as the commission of a serious crime.
The Creighton ruling,49 although criticized by some as destroying the
legacy of the common law theory of guilt, demonstrates how different issues
of unconstitutionality can arise in matters of homicide. In fact, if the
principles of guilt were not totally followed in this case, it was to better
recognize a fundamental penological principle: that of the necessary
proportionality of offences and sentences. In a homicide offence that
results in two offenders being found guilty of the same crime, when one has
only the minimum mens rea required and the other shows more moral
turpitude, the sentence must be able to fluctuate in intensity and vary
according to different degrees of moral culpability.50
47 The legislator considers abuse of the offender's spouse and children to be an aggravating
circumstance of an offence. See Criminal Code, supra note 3, s. 718.2(ii). The legislator has, therefore,
chosen to punish spouse and child abuse more severely, without abandoning the principle of
proportionality stated in s. 718.1. However, in the Firearms Act, supra note 2, spouse and child abuse
with a firearms is now more severely punished. This adds to s. 718.2 (ii) of the Criminal Code, while
contradicting s. 718.1.
48 R v. Vaillancouri; [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636; See generally A. Boisvert, "Les Exigences
Constitutionnelles en Matiare de Faute Pnale: un Bilan Critique" (1994) 73 Can. Bar. Rev. 161.
4 9 R. v. Creighton, [199313 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Creighton]. I agree with much of the criticism of
this ruling and the damaging effects it has on the coherent theory of offence in criminal law. See e.g. A.
Brudner, "Proportionality, Stigma and Discretion" (1996) 38 Cr. L.Q. 302; A. Boisvert, supra note 48;
M. J. Bryant, "Criminal Fault as per the Lamer Court and the Ghost of William McIntyre" (1995) 33
Osgoode Hall lJ. 79. However, this case gave constitutional status to the sentencing principle of
proportionality. Even though the notion of fault is different in determining guilt and sentences, the
constitutional principle requires taking the offender's degree of moral turpitude into account to
determine a sentence.
50 Contra R v. Arkell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 695. In this case, it was decided that the classification of
murders under s. 214(5) of the Criminal Code to determine the sentence, was neither arbitrary nor
irrational because there was a relationship between the classification and the offender's degree of guilt.
InR v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227 at 243 [hereinafter Shropshire]. Justice Lamer's opinion on s. 744
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Among the various forms of guilt theory expressed during the
debate on the constitutionality of legislated offences, henceforth for
purposes of establishing the accompanying responsibility scheme we have
a theory of guilt concerning sentencing that emphasizes the principle of
proportionality of offences and sentences. A court that cannot apply this
principle of proportionality and that must by legislative decree impose a
minimum sentence on someone that does not deserve it, will end up
punishing the offender too harshly. This state of affairs is not just t
2. Increasing sentence severity
While it is theoretically possible that judges could impose a lesser
sentence in the case of a knife homicide than in the case of a gun homicide,
we can presume that they would try to apply the principle of proportionality
more severely to punish the offender whose crime seems more
reprehensible. As such, a minimum sentence of four years could serve to
lengthen all homicide sentences and all sentences in general.
Coming back to the two previously mentioned homicides, one with
a firearm and one with a knife, a 1993 study by the Canadian Centre for
Justice Statistics states that two-thirds of convictions for manslaughter were
accompanied by an average prison term of four years." Consequently,
before changes to the Firearms Act, a judge could deem a homicide with a
knife as being more reprehensible than a homicide with a gun, and use the
average sentence as a benchmark to punish both homicides. With the new
legislation, a judge must consider the minimum of four years as a base
sentence for the homicide with a gun. For all other homicides to which the
minimum sentence does not apply, if they are seen as relatively more
reprehensible, they may receive a sentence of more than four years when,
on average, these homicides used to be punished by sentences of under four
years.
Generally, minimum sentences cause all other sentences to become
longer. By applying minimum sentences to some criminal offences such as
impaired driving, use of a firearm, and drug trafficking-until this was
of the Criminal Code raises the idea that, in second degree murder, there are various degrees of
seriousness and guilt that call for a range of sentences bete.cen ten and tventy.five years.
51 This can be summarized in Justice Sopinka'sevords in Kndler,, uFra note 29 at 791: 'Principles
of fundamental justice are not limited by public opinion of the day. The proteeton afforded by s. 7
extends to individualswho face unjust situations which are not recognized as such by the majority"
52,'Public Perceptions" supra note 6. table S.
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declared unconstitutional in Smith, the legislator predetermines the
seriousness of the crime irrespective of its context, and compares it to all
other crimes that are not accompanied by a minimum sentence. In fact, the
legislator introduces an "intruder" as perceived by the courts into the crime
gravity scale. A crime with a minimum sentence need only be perceived as
relatively less serious than other crimes that are usually punished by an
equal sentence for the courts subsequently to increase the sentences
affecting the crimes they consider more serious.5"
C. An Ineffective Sentence
The legislator may argue that minimum sentences meet important
goals and constitute an essential means of control, while ensuring the least
possible infringement on the rights of the accused. Thus, it may be argued
that minimum sentences are acceptable in a free and democratic society
under section 1 of the Charter.
Legislators outlined the rationale for minimum sentences through
various background papers and action plans on firearm control." They
argued that minimum sentences are essential to preventing violence in our
society by deterring crimes committed with a firearm. The Government's
Action Plan on Firearms Control states: "it is suggested to impose longer
minimum sentences for the use of a firearm when committing certain
serious offences."55 Harsher punishments are desired since present
sentences fall short of what legislators consider sufficient. Let us look more
closely to see if imposing minimum sentences is likely to reach the
objectives of general prevention and retribution set out by lawmakers.
Landreville, supra note 21; P. Landreville, "Prison Overpopulation and Strategies for
Decarceration" (1995) 37 Can. J. Crim. 39; H. Dumont, Les solutions de Rechange d 1a Peine
d'Emprisonnement du Drot Pnal Canadien: Le Triomphe de l'Jntolirence et de PIrrationalitt! stir
l'Humanisrne et la Libert, (Cowansville: Yvon Blais Publishing, 1994) at 899-900.
Department of Justice, The Government's Action Plan on Firearms Control (Ottawa: Public
Works and Government Services Canada, 1994) at 6-8 [hereinafter Government Action Plan;
Background Information, supra note 2 at 1.
5 5 Ibid. at 6-7; See MacLellan, supra note 10 at 174-75; 0. Fedorowycz, "Homicide in Canada-
1995" (1995) 16:11 Juristat 1. The study indicates that homicide committed with a knife is slightly more
frequent (31.2 per cent) than homicide committed with a gun (30 per cent).
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1. The ineffectiveness of the sentence in attaining general deterrence
Returning to the homicide example, the government believes
harsher sentences will reduce the number of homicides committed with a
firearm. The potential offender is henceforth supposed to be more deterred
by the prospect of a minimum sentence of four years imprisonment than
would be the case if the sentence did not exist.
However, during its review of the bill, the government had access
to a study concluding that minimum sentences were not a particularly good
method of overall crime prevention?% As compared to the targeted
reduction in crime rates with the imposition of minimum sentences, the
study concluded that any impact would be minimal. Moreover, all studies
on the subject indicate a lack of any significant correlation between harsher
sentences and crime reduction. They further show that offenders are not
generally aware of the sentences they may face vhen committing these
crimes.'
In fact, assuming minimum sentences do have a significant potential
to reduce crime committed with a firearm, this potential could only be
established by comparing the results of mandatory minimum sentences and
those of the previous sentence. The government must be unaware of the
vast range of sentences handed down in homicide cases. It is also
impossible to assume offenders know the specific punishment for the form
of homicide they are about to commit. Before committing a homicide, an
offender generally Inows that it is illegal to dll, that it is serious, and that
it leads to imprisonment. It is difficult to imagine that minimum sentences
could exert an increased overall deterrence or raise an offender's
knowledge of the various punishments, thereby reducing the risk that they
would commit a crime.
Unfortunately, many crimes perpetrated with a firearm are
committed in incidents of family and spousal abuse, and with legally owned
hunting rifles. Access to a firearm may be the main risk factor for such
56 Research on the .4pplication of the Criminal C e Scctton L5 by C Meredith, B Stemnk & S
Palmer (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1994) [hetemafter.gc!tcatwn Rkscarchl, Canadtan
Sentencing Commission, Sanctions LUgales et Dissuasion, by D. Cousmeau t Ottava: Dcpartment of
Supply and Services Canada, 198S); A. Blumstem, J. Cohen & D, Nagin. eds. Dczcrcnce an,
Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects qf Criminal Sanctwns an Crmze Rates VWa hungton; Nattonal
Academy of Sciences, 1978) at 95-159; V. M. E an,SeczialStnctreandLa. :VrctcalarEmrtal
Perspectives (Neiibury Park: Sage Publications, 1990) at 72-73.
57 S. Brochu, O. Duranleau & N. Bourdeau, "Impaircd Driiing, Anay- isof Shcrbrooke Statttcs"
(1990) 30 Can. J. Crim. 279; See also R. Hastings. "A Comment on the Prorsals for Firearms
Controls" (1995) 37 Can. J. Crim. 220 at 226-27.
2001]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 39, NOS. 2 & 3
offences.58 Therefore, by enforcing stricter firearms control and safe
storage, the government would be taking crucial steps to reduce risk. In the
long run, reducing the number of handguns and military or para-military
guns can also have an impact on the number of robberies. In general,
having fewer weapons could lower the number of fatal accidents "and
suicides.59 The government could demonstrate a logical relationship
between the objective of generally preventing violent crime and a stricter
control of firearms." On the other hand, it is more difficult to show the
logical relationship between the objective of general prevention and the
imposition of a minimum sentence of four years. This relationship is
tenuous and marginal at best, and appears completely non-existent in most
cases.
As it is impossible to establish the deterrent value of four-year
minimum sentences; their effectiveness will have to be re-evaluated each
time a crime requiring their application is committed. These sentences will
continue to be evaluated in terms of the failure of an overall prevention
policy. Their usefulness and their effectiveness will thus be judged through
the application of the new offence categories and the prosecution of their
perpetrators.
2. The irrationality of the sentence in administering deserved
retribution
These excessively severe minimum sentences will likewise work
against the legislator's objective of punishing offenders who commit them.
In fact, minimum sentences generally reduce the likelihood of conviction.
For example, since 1976 section 85 of the Criminal Code has provided for
a minimum sentence of one year for the use of a firearm while committing
an indictable offence, to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed
for the original offence. A study carried out for the government reports
58 Kellerman, supra note 9; See also the detailed review by T. Gabor, "The Proposed Canadian
Legislation Firearms: More Symbolism than Prevention" (1995) 37 Can. J. Crim. 195.
Boyd, supra note 7.
60 Decision Dynamics Corporation, Evaluation of the Canadian Gun Control Legislation: Final
Report, by E. Scarff (Ottawa: Solicitor General, 1983); Research and Statistics Section, Firearns
Statistics: Updated Tables by Q. Hung, (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1995); Department of Justice,
Domestic Homicides Involving the Use of Firearms, (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1992);T. Gabor, The
Impact of the Availability of Firearms on Violent Crime, Suicide and Accidental Death: A Review of the
Literature with Special Reference to the Canadian Suicide (Ottawa, Department of Justice, 1994).
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that this minimum sentence has never met its objective t Two-thirds of the
charges laid under section 85 did not result in conviction because of
dismissal, stay of proceedings, or discontinuance by the complainant. This
situation can be partly explained by the lack of evidence and plea
bargaining. Because this offence is ordinarily associated with an initial
offence, judges generally apply the aggregate sentence principle so that the
sum of the sentences reflects the objective seriousness of the offence and
the overall guilt of its perpetrator. Consequently, this technique thwarts the
aim of systematically tougher sentencing via the imposition of minimum
sentences.62
Other adverse systemic impacts are to be expected from mandatory
minimum sentences. The prospect of harsh minimum sentences will result
in more legal proceedings and fewer guilty pleas. The defence is likely to
use every legal technicality possible to protect its client from the minimum
sentence. One of two things may happen: either proceedings will be more
difficult for the Crown because the defence is more agressive or, given their
increased caseload, Crown attorneys will find many good reasons to offer
a lesser sentence in exchange for a guilty plea on a charge that does not
carry with it the minimum sentence.
For a long time, studies have shown that the harsher the
punishment the more difficult it is to enforce t 3 When harsh punishments
are too frequently imposed, judicial mechanisms will step in to make it
difficult to enforce the sentence. Political vll to extend enforcement to
crimes that previously went unpunished must be implemented by imposing
moderate sentences. No one sentence can be both frequent and severe. The
development of lighter sentences as alternatives to harsher sentences
increases the frequency of these lighter sentences, while greater harshness
of a punishment decreases its frequency and use. Therefore, we can expect
that the legislator's goal of punishing more offenders who commit a serious
criminal offence with a firearm, will inevitably be styrnied.
Consequently, the legislator has chosen an ineffective means in
trying to better control violent crime. It is irrational and must be eliminated
61 Application Research, supra note 56 at 7.
62 GorenmentAction Plan, supra note 54 at 7.
63 M. Cusson,"Pourquoi punir?" in CinzinaloectDrclztsdel'Hommnre (Pans Dalloz. 19S7) at 122
PJ. Cook, "The Economics of Criminal Sanctions" m M. Fnedland, ed., Sancatns and Rc, ards in th
LegalSystem. A MultidiciplinariyApproach, (Toronto: Uni% ersity of Toronto Prcs, 19S9) at 51-7a; La.v
Reform Commission, Droi4 Objcctifs Publics ct Obscnation des Nonnes %vorlang palper) |Ottav -,
Department of Supplies and Services Canada, 196).
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in light of better alternatives, such as stricter firearm control.'4 In addition,
the legislator could have made the use of a firearm an aggravating factor
of the gravity of an offence, rather than creating a sentencing scheme that
is cruel and unjust.
D. An Arbitrary Sentence
Minimum sentences have several adverse effects on crime control.
In fact, their disadvantages greatly outweigh any advantages.
1. Good and bad systemic discretion
The law's severity is supposed to be offset by the discretionary
power of police officers and prosecutors to select which cases to prosecute
and which pleas to accept on reduced charges. Maintaining a high guilty
plea level in the Canadian judicial system depends, in part, on the
widespread practice of rewarding this plea with more lenient sentences. 65
We should not ignore the adverse possibility of increased hidden
justice in the judicial system. Minimum sentences mean that the legislator
removes the court's discretion to impose an appropriate sentence on the
offender in favour of a predetermined legislated sentence that is supposed
to apply to all cases. This complete removal of judicial discretion will
inevitably be replaced by the prosecutor's concealed discretion. The justice
system cannot operate without discretion. In fact, it is an integral part of
decisions and judgments, and should not be seen as something that is
intrinsically bad. However, by resorting to minimum sentences, the
legislator reveals a great deal about its own assessment of the good and bad
use of discretion by decision-makers in the justice system.
On the basis of studies, lawmakers have been convinced that
Canadian sentencing creates unjustified disparities and that it is up to them
to set the guidelines for determining sentences in order to oversee judicial
discretion and promote greater sentencing consistency.66 In all of the
sentencing models suggested to eliminate the disparity between sentences
and to better oversee judicial discretion (the Archambault Report,67
64 R. v. Oakes, [19861 1 S.C.R. 103.
65 Dumont, supra note 31 at 172-77.
66 Government of Canada, Sentencing (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1984).
6 7
Supra note 6.
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Daubney Report, 3 Bill C-2269), the idea of eliminating discretion by setting
up predetermined legislated sentences was never proposed.
Whether we like it or not, the minimum sentence of four years, a
particularly harsh minimum7 given the length of prison terms generally
imposed in Canada, will constitute a legislated scale that deprives judges of
their duty to assess and set appropriate sentences. The legislator claims to
be targeting abuses of judicial discretion in sentencing and, consequently,
eliminates judicial discretion for serious Criminal Code offences. However,
when it came time to choose a sentencing model under the new Sentencing
Act,71 the same lawmaker was extremely timid in its strategies to manage
judicial discretion. It also disregarded many appropriate suggestions of the
Archambault Commission7 addressing sentencing disparity resulting from
excessive use of judicial discretion.
The government also raised great concerns about the discretion of
prosecutors, knowing that minimum sentences will increase this discretion,
inevitably leading them to negotiate the lessening of charges carrying
minimum sentences. To solve this problem, Allan Rock, then Minister of
Justice, apparently discussed the situation with his provincial and territorial
counterparts. He is reported to have asked the Attorneys General "to urge
their deputies to apply section 85 of the Criminal Code effectively and to set
out guidelines to this effect."73 Furthermore, he is supposed to have asked
them to instruct Crown attorneys to seek the sentences outlined in the law
each time that it is possible to prove to the court that firearms were used
to commit the crime. Without wanting to criticize all the laudable efforts
of the Minister of Justice to promote better firearm control in Canadian
society, it is impossible for me to accept that an Attorney General,
motivated as he or she may be by good intentions, should act as an
enlightened despot.
Although the minister was shown the ineffectiveness of the
minimum sentence under section 85 of the Criminal Code, he persisted in
enacting them. As Philip C. Stenning wrote, "[i]f it doesn't work, let's do
6
S Standing Committee on Justice and Solicitor General, Taking Rcsponsibda,, tOttava: Queen's
Printer, 198) [Chair: D. DaubneyI.
69 An Act to amend the Cimninal Code (scntcncmgu and other Acts in canscquence dhreof, 195,
S.C.. c.22.
70 Supra note 21.
71 Supra note 69.
72 See Ardiambault Repor4 supra note 6.
73 GovemmentAction Plan, supra note 54 at 8; Supra not 10 at 131-3
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more of it."'7 Now that prosecutors have been ordered to use their
discretion properly, everything is supposed to be settled.
However, the increase of hidden discretion cannot be eliminated by
political exhortations to prosecute offenders. Moreover, any instruction by
an Attorney General to his or her deputies that serves to completely
remove all prosecutorial discretion from the prosecutor in a particular case,
is a questionable judicial practice in itself. The Crown attorney does
exercise discretion in deciding to prosecute. However, since this is no more
than a discretionary administrative act, it cannot be transformed into an
exercise of authority related to a superior's instruction; it cannot be
accomplished under the orders of a third party, nor can a person be forced
completely to give up their discretion. In this regard, guidelines that
deprive an individual of his or her discretion to make decisions based on
the merits and circumstances of each case, have already been eliminated in
administrative75and criminal law.76
Unrealistic orders and guidelines from an Attorney General to his
or her deputies, where the prosecutors' caseload becomes considerably
heavier because of a law that they do not necessarily want, will not be well
received. Ultimately, these negative repercussions are likely further to
undermine public confidence in the sound administration of justice. They
may also strengthen the desire of Canadians for harsher punishments,
causing them to criticize the present criminal laws as being excessively
lenient.
P. Stenning, "Solutions in Search of Problems: A Critique of the Federal Government's Gun
Control Proposals" (1995) 37 Can. J. Crim. 184 at 190. "The fact that no one else in the world has
apparently figured out yet how to achieve this is evidently not considered worthy of mention, let alone
discussion. The all-important impression that the government is taking 'tough action ... to address
violence in society' seems to be all that matters here."
75 G. P~pin & Y. Ouellette, Principesde ContentieuxAdministratif, 2d ed. (Cowansville: Yvon Blais,
1982) at 199-200; Yhap v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [19901 F.C. 722 at 738;
J. Viliaggi, "L'Application de )a Directive et le R61e du Tribunal Administratif" in Diveloppements
Ricents en DroitAdministratif (Qudbec: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1989) vol.2 at 77-85.
7 6 ProcureurGdniraldu Quibecv. Brunet, [19941 R.J.Q. 337; Law Reform Commission of Canada,
Controlling Criminal Prosecutions: the Attorney General and the Crown Prosecutor (Working Paper 62)
(Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1990) at 17: "To determine the legality of these
guidelines, one would have to determine whether they would be a lawful exercise of discretion if
exercised by the Attorney General personally. It would seem that, so long as there remains room to
examine the individual case on its own merits, the guidelines would not be improper."; K. Chasse, "The
Role of the Prosecutor" in S. Oxner ed., Criminal Justice (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) 79 at 80: " But
because he is a member of cabinet, the Attorney General sets policy and practice in terms of general
statementsof principle, and not as directives for conducting of particular prosecutions against particular
individuals." See also R. v. Catagas (1977), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 296.
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This irrational escalation in the severity of punishment will be the
direct result of legislation inspired by fear and the desire of election-
minded politicians to echo an irrational public opinion that is ill-informed
about the actual extent of violent crime.
2. Contradictions in penal policy
It would not be possible to end this discussion on the unacceptable
nature of minimum sentences without mentioning other systemic
contradictions that relate to the penal policy of the Canadian government.
The 1990s penal policy lead to the inexcusable overrepresentation
of Aboriginals in correctional institutions, especially in the Prairies? The
government claims to want to act on this issue. It emphasizes in Bill C-22
that in imposing a sentence a court must examine all alternatives to
imprisonment that are justified in the circumstances, especially in the case
of Aboriginal offenders.7  We also know that the disappearance of
traditional aboriginal values, endemic alcoholism, and the disruption of
Amerindian culture and poverty, are some of the contributing factors that
lead to violent crime among Aboriginal people, especially in the family."
We also know that firearms are considered essential tools of the traditional
aboriginal way of life.
We need to ask lawmakers how they plan to reconcile the Firearms
Act, which aims to firmly address violent crime through minimum sentences
and absolute prohibition orders on possessing firearms, with the
commitments of the new Sentencing Act, which encourage courts to be
imaginative and examine all alternatives for aboriginal offenders. What can
a judge do with minimum sentences? How can we promote greater
flexibility in the matter of Aboriginal criminal justice when judges are
severely restricted in their authority to choose a sentence?
T.C. Griffiths & JC. Yerbury, "Understanding Abonginal Crime and Cnminaht; A Case
Study' in M.A. Jackson & C.T. Griffiths, eds,. Canadian Cr nor,-: Pcr.asL as an Crime and
Criminality (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1995) 353; Canadian Centre for Justice Stattics'Adit
Correctional Services in Canada 1993-1994 (Ottav.a, Statistics Canada, 1994), Chart 17; Ta. ards Safer
Communities, supra note 5 at 30-33.
7G See Criininal Code, supra note 3, s. 718.2(e).
79 A.N. Doob, M. G. Grossman & R. Auger, "Aboriginal Homicide in Ontaric" (1994) 36 Can
J. Crim. 29; S.A. Vanderburg, J.R. Weekes & \V.A. Milison, "Early Substance Use and its Impa2ct on
Adult Offender Alcohol and Drug Problems" (1995) 7:1 Feimn on Ce rcctans Research 14; Solicitor
General Canada, Final Report: Task Force on Abriginal Pcepfes i Federal Correctians, (Ottava;
Government of Canada, 19 8).
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Lighter sentences must be one of the weapons available to combat
the problem of violence in society. This is the only punitive option that can
lead us to seek strategies other than strict punishment to control violence,
and allows communities to deal with violent persons in ways other than
with overzealousness and resentment. Lighter sentences are more likely to
promote values of tolerance, security, and peace in society and in criminals.
Ultimately, they are more conducive to humane and consistent crime
control.
III. EPILOGUE: HARD TIME FOR CRIMINALS, HARD TIMES
FOR TOLERANCE °
Comments on and analyses of recent cases on mandatory minimum
sentences and the evolution of the interpretation of section 12 of the
Charter by the Supreme Court have already been published.8 In this
epilogue, I revisit a few of the ideas developed in my 1997 article and
evaluate the impact that Supreme Court decisions have had on the
fundamental principle of proportionality in sentencing.
When this article was published in French four years ago, the
Supreme Court had not yet rendered its decisions in Morrisey82 and
Latiner3 and there was hope, at least in my view, that the Charterwould be
a useful tool in stopping the government from resorting to harsh and unjust
punishment in the unusual form of mandatory minimum custodial
sentences.
But I was not counting on the shift by the Supreme Court from an
interventionist strategy to a deferential attitude towards Parliament. It was
also presumptuous to seek that my doctrinal contribution to the general
80 For this epilogue, I acknowledge the contribution of my research assistant Maric- Pvc Sylvcstrc,
presently an LLM. student at Harvard Law School.
81 K. Roach, "Editorial: Mandatory Sentences" (2001) 44 Crim. L.Q 261; A. Boisvert et at.,
"Editorial" (2001) 6 Can. Crim. L.R. 125; N. Crutcher, "Mandatory Minimum Penalties of
Imprisonment: An Historical Analysis" (2001) 44 Crim. LQ. 279; B. Sneiderman, "The Case of Bernard
Latimer: A Commentary on Crime and Punishment" (1999) 37 Alta L Rev. 1017; A. Manson,
"Morrisey: Observations on Criminal Negligence and s. 12 Methodology" (2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 121; A.
Manson, "Motivation, the Supreme Court and the Mandatory Sentencing for Murder" (2001) 39 C.R.
(5th) 65.
8 2 R. v. Morrisey, [200012 S.C.R.90 [hereinafter Morrisey]; See also R. v. Wust, [20001 1 S.C.R.455
[hereinafter WustI.
8 3 R. v. Latimer, [20001 1 S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Latimer].
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condemnation of mandatory minimum sentences would influence the
evolution of criminal law and penology.e4
The choice is Parliament'son the use of minimum scntence s though considcrable diffcrence
of opinion continues on the vwisdom of emplo~ing minimum !sentenccs from a cuiminal law,
policy or penological point of view!s
Mandatory minimum custodial sentencing is lilkely here to stay. We
cannot eradicate it through the Charter safeguards of sections 7 and 12,
recommendations of thoughtful studies, ' or through doctrinal research and
analysis.
Moreover, the principled approach to sentencing of Part XXIII of
the Criminal Code is becoming a thing of the past, as Parliament has since
enacted many ad hoc exceptional pieces of legislation contrary to general
sentencing principles implemented in Part XXIII. For example, the
government addressed violent and sexual criminality more seriously in
adding eighteen new minimum penalties to the biminal Code.' It
narrowed parole access and mandatory supervision2 planned the extension
of preventive detention for a larger group of dangerous criminals, and
created a new sanction attaching a lengthy period of supervision to
penitentiary long-term offenders.69 It also decided to submit more juveniles
to adult court, and adopted a rigorous punitive attitude toward their
criminal responsibility.9' Harsh sentencing laws are now regarded as
securing better protection for women and children. However, this trend is
8 4 H. Dumont, "Disarmonsles Canadiens et Armons-nousde Tolrance" (Wlf712 Can. Crim. L
R. 43.
$5 Latimer, supra note 83 at 42.
S6 Archarnbault Report, supra note 6; Ouisnct, supra note 33.
S7 Crutcher, supra note S1 at 279: "Of more than 40 criminal offences found -ithin the 193)
Criminal Code of Canada, 29 carry a mandatory minimum ranalty of imprisonment. The bulk of thesz
punishments are a result of Bill C-OS, the 1995 Fireamrs.4ct -hich added 18 new minimum nAttes
to the Criminal Code. The dramatic increase in the use of this mode of pumshment issrnsing giwen
the controversial nature of minimal penalties." See also tb&. at 303:"In IWb, a Bill, as introduced that
would create a new offence of aggravated procuring and Itrng of the a'.ail; of child prostitutton.,hich
would carry a minimum fie year term of imprisonment," According to the author, the actual p-.rtoJ
accounts for the most important use of the mandatory penalty of imprironment 'ince the first l8W2
Criminal Code.
SS Supra note 3, -s. 745.6, 746.1
$9 Ibid., Part XXIV.
9 0 BiII C-7: An Act in Respect of Criminal Justice for le i ng Pcrsons and to .4 mcndI ard R q- I:Jtcr
Acts, 1st Sess., 47th Par., 2001 (passed May 29, 20011.
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problematic, as it does not leave room for alternative approaches to resolve
the problem of violence in society.
Politicians, supposedly following public demands, implemented
these changes in the criminal lawwith no afterthought for the repercussions
on the spirit of the reform favouring moderation and limited use of
imprisonment. They even spoke of restorative justice when, in fact, their
acts could neutralize any significant impact on sentencing, particularly for
Aboriginal offenders and young offenders. However, this chaotic legislative
approach to reform in the field of sentencing and punishment, is a matter
of concern for experts in the field,9' who are also preoccupied by media
conduct that often stimulate public contempt, intolerance, rage, and
injustice. Law and order is trendy. These are hard times for tolerance and
moderate sentencing!
Meanwhile, it is ironic to see the Supreme Court developing
deference towards short-sighted and poor sentencing lawmaking. The
previous dialogue between the legislator and the Supreme Court, however,
was not helpful in promoting justice and moderation in the application of
criminal law. Reactive legislation after a Supreme Court decision and
anecdotal legislation after public outcry are questionable tools that bring
chaos and arbitrariness rather than coherence and justice.
At the expense of effective constitutional safeguards for the control
of sentencing laws, the Supreme Court is now offering the next best thing
to the offender who could be exposed to a cruel punishment: a
constitutional exemption. The Supreme Court stops controlling the
legislator from enacting unjust sentencing laws-a moral lesson suffices.
Indeed, the Court will not apply the law in a case where an extremely
disproportionate punishment could be inflicted on an extraordinarily
likeable offender, but now, it will not offer a remedy to an unjust
sentencing law. The judicial authority washes its hands, even if it sees an
injustice done by the legislator!
Relieved by the Supreme Court's new gentle approach towards its
sentencing laws, the government may start to consider its "looking good
and feeling good legislation" as the product of wisdom. With its renewed
91
Although a consensus on the scope of codification and on the importance of codifying all our
criminal law does not necessarily exist in Canada, there is unanimity among specialists that the way
legislative changes are presently occurring is not making Canadian criminal law just and clear. Indeed,
at a 1998 meeting held at Queen's University where a task force examined the question of how to make
criminal law just and clear, participants were all critical of actual piecemeal legislative changes to the
Criminal Code. See D. Stuart, R. Delisle, & A. Manson, eds., Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law.
A Criminal Reports Forum (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 574.
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confidence, it may decide to preserve its unjust sentencing laws, while in
due time the Governor-in-Council might act kindly and show mercy to
Latimer! Doing justice to an offender, unjustly but legally punished, is now
left to the clemency of politicians!' 2
Despite the 1996 sentencing reform, the question of how to bring
more justice and humanity to sentencing is still a major issue. After a
steady decrease of criminality over the last decade and the decline of
violent and property crimes, Canadians remain fearful and apprehensive. "
Parliament is acting on these unfounded feelings of insecurity toward
common crimes with the strategy of "being tough on crime," but its result
is "being tough on criminals," Recent statistics illustrate that the median
length of custody sentences has increased dramatically since 1994-95. A
fift3 per cent increase is related to crimes against the person," particularly
for common and sexual assault, sexual abuse, and manslaughter.r'
I have raised some concerns about the potential inflationary effect
of mandatory sanctions of imprisonment for increasing the severity of all
sentences, not only for the crimes to which it is attached, but with regards
to crimes considered more serious. Madam Justice Louise Arbour
confirmed that minimum sentences will inevitably have this effect. Indeed,
the principle of proportionality inevitably operates to apply the minimum
sentence to the best offender, in order to give effect to the inflationary
legislative scheme.06
Re-establishing the principle of proportionality on a firm ground
to measure crime and punishment, and strengthening it to allow sentencing
flexibility and moderation are the two necessary ingredients to dismantling
the logic of escalation that the Supreme Court and the legislators are
implementing in sentencing. As recently stated in a different and more
dramatic context, "freedom and fear, justice and cruelty have always been
at war."97 In the history of mankind and in the history of criminal law, we
92 Supra note 83 at 42-43.
9 3 R. Kong, "Canadian Crime Statistics, 1997" jN.97) 1,311 Jurtstnt I at S.
94 J.V. Roberts & C. Grimes. "Adult Criminal Court Statistics, l,9iY' (,2|L 20, .1 Jhtn I at
13-15.
95 Ibid.
9 6 Monisg, supra note 82 at 132-35.
97 President George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Congress and the American People"
(Presidential Address on Capital Hill, 20 Septcmber 2C 01). online: The X hite Hou2
<http:/ih~~w,.whitehousegoxnev.reease0tIi20tl;/2ii-html> (Date aece d. 23 Otobe-r
2001).
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need, and could have if the 1996 sentencing reform was taken seriously, a
comprehensive set of judicial guidelines to instill moderation. We still need
the help of the Supreme Court to make peace on the battleground of
sentencing, and a more comprehensive principle of proportionality could
be a useful tool to achieve peace within sentencing.
A plea for moderation in sentencing was the Canadian
government's principal concern when planniig the 1996 reform and, since
then, it is still relevant policy for sanctioning "good" and "bad" criminals.98
The reform (section 718.1 of the Criminal Code) put forward the principle
that a sentence must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the
degree of responsibility of the offender. By designating it as the
fundamental principle of sentencing, there is no doubt that Parliament has
chosen to raise this principle above others. Properly understood, it signifies
the eradication of the idea of achieving general deterrence by aggravating
a particular sentence and imposing exemplary punishment on a specific
criminal. The deterrent impact of a particular sentence is not supported by
empirical research" and it is questionable whether it has any effect on the
crime rate. Long prison terms that do not fit the specific crime and the
specific criminal, but include additional punishment to deter others and
reduce the prevalence of crime in the community, are not in accordance
with the proportionality principle as set in section 718.1 of the Criminal
Code. 1°
Before the reform in Smith,t"' Justice Lamer interpreted the
principle of proportionality when he declared the unconstitutionality of a
minimum of seven years for the importation of a narcotic:
In assessing whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, the court must first consider the
gravity of the offence, the personal characteristics of the offender and the particular
circumstances of the case in order to determine what range of sentences would have been
98 H. Dumont, "Less is Best: the Sentencing Reform Unattainable Goal?" (Session on Criminal
Law, Procedure and Evidence, National Justice Institute, 19-21 March 1997).
Cousineau, supra note 56; D. Nagin, "General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical
Evidence" in A. Blumstein & J. Cohen, eds., Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of
Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates, (Washington: Panel on Research Council, 1978) at 95-159.
100 Madam Justice Arbour also made an important observation on the negative side-effect of
deterrent sentencing in Wust,supra note 82 at 467: "Even if it can be argued that harsh, unfit sentences
may prove to be a powerful deterrent, and therefore still serve a valid purpose, it seems to me that
sentences that are unjustly severe are more likely to inspire contempt and resentment than to foster
compliance with the law. It is a well-established principle of the criminal justice system that judges must
strive to impose a sentence tailored to the individual case."
101 Smith, supra note 25.
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appropriate to punish, rehabilitate or deter this particular offender or to protect the public
from this particular offender. The other purroqes r-hich may 1'z pursued by the imprttion
of -punishment, in particular the deterrence of other potential offenders, are thus not
relevant at this stage of the inquiry. This does not mean that the judge or the legislator can
no longer consider general deterrence or other panological purpases that go beonJ the
particular offender in determining a sentence, but only that the re'uItm cntencc must not
be grossly disproportionate to v\hat the offender desercs. If a gro-ly drsprop- rionate
sentence is 'prescribed by law,' then the purpLrc v htch it seehs to attain xill fall to be
assessed under s. 1. Section 12 ensures that indnidual offenders recic' punishments that
are appropriate, or at least not grossly disprorortionate, to their particular circumtanccf,
while s. 1 permits this right to be overridden to achiie ome important setal b eccti, c."
According to this point of view, a government that ,Ashes to impose
a grossly disproportionate minimal custodial sentence to achieve general
deterrence has the burden of proving that it is justified in a free and
democratic society. Since Smith, however, the Supreme Court has blended
and blurred its reasoning on the principle of proportionality. It has not
distinguished the object of the principle when measuring gross
disproportionality for the purpose of section 12 of the Charter or when it
considers the proportionality of means chosen by the legislator for
achieving general deterrence under a section 1 analysis.*3 This blurring and
blending has happened in two stages of the reasoning. First, by concluding
that mandatory sentences were constitutional in many cases,"m the Supreme
Court began to look at the penological objectives of mandatory terms of
imprisonment, such as general deterrence and denunciation, as relevant
factors for the evaluation of gross disproportionality of minimum
sentences. A consequence of this reasoning is that the rationale and the
justifications of the sentencing laws are no longer constitutional issues.
Second, the shift from a section 52 constitutional analysis of the legislation
to a constitutional exemption analysis had an impact on the burden of
proof of both parties and on the scope of their arguments. The government
can rest in peace and the offender must concentrate on the "uniqueness"
of his or her situation, rather than relying on sentencing policy issues.
The evolution of the constitutional jurisprudence on mandatory
sentencing has had another disastrous consequence: the proportionality
principle is no longer a principle of restraint and moderation. When the
principle of proportionality gives effect to the inflationary scheme of the
102 Ibid. at 1073.
103 A. Bois'ert, "Peines Minimales Obligateires et E.emptions Conqttuttonteles [a Polittquz
du Pire" 31:3 R.G.D. [forthcoming in 2001.
10 4 Morr& - , supra note S2; R. v. LiLvton. [l9'U 2S.CR. 711; Gvtz:,pura note 26; R. % Lions
[19S7] 2 S.C.R. 309; Latiner, supra note S3.
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legislator without further questioning the values and purposes of changing
the scale of severity for a crime, it allows for any scale of severity. In the
long run, it eliminates the possibility of demonstrating gross
disproportionality in Canadian sentencing. 5
Proportionality is a retributive concept that focuses on the offender's past conduct as
opposed to utilitarian concerns about the future effects of punishment on the offender or
others through deterrence or rehabilitation. Retribution is a legitimate concern in sentencing
but it should not be confused with revenge or vengeance which produces an unrestrained and
'uncalibrated act of harm upon another, frequently motivated by emotion and anger.' In
contrast, retribution is an objective, reasoned and measured determination of an appropriate
punishment which properly reflects the moral culpability of the offender. It restraints
punishment to ensure 'the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, and nothing
more.' 106
Another form of confusion resulted from the Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence concerning the proportionality principle, which
requires the appreciation of the degree of responsibility of the offender for
the determination of a just sentence. Before Morrisey and Latimer,
especially in the case of manslaughter, the Court promoted the necessity of
sentencing flexibility for the operation of the proportionality principle and
the adequate adjustment of the severity of a sentence to the offender's
degree of fault."° The constitutionality of a minimum of four years in
Morrisey, and of a minimum detention of ten years in Latimer, has left us
only with the bone of the constitutional principle of proportionality under
section 7 of the Charter.1t 8
The fault required for the determination of responsibility for a
specific crime is the same for all offenders accused of this crime and,
generally, motivation is not a relevant element for the attribution of guilt.
But when it is time to evaluate the blameworthiness of a specific offender
for the purpose of a fit and just sentence, his or her motivation, good
character, social background, intellectual capacities, and community
context (more specifically for Aboriginals) are all relevant aspects for the
appreciation of his or her fault. In other words, the most sympathetic and
least blameworthy person may have committed a crime with the required
fault, but the mandatory sentence can deprive that individual of the right
105 Morrisey, supra note 81 at 136.
106 K. Roach, CriminalLaw, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 300-01, quoting from A. (C.A.),
supra note 42.
107 Creighton, supra note 49.
108 Supra note 103.
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to an assessment by a judge of all relevant dimensions of moral culpability
that are encompassed in the proportionality principle of sentencing. Putting
aside constitutional arguments for a moment, in the Latimer case the trial
judge and the jury were convinced that a minimum of ten years was not
commensurate with the defendant's moral culpability. They felt that they
were not doing justice if they were unable to take his motivation
(compassion) into account in sentencing. The notion that there must be a
gradation of punishments according to the malignity of offences and degree
of turpitude of offenders is a legislative principle of fundamental justice in
sentencing. However, considering the results in Monisey and Latimer, it is
sad to say that the Supreme Court has not yet conferred the Charter title of
nobility upon this principle.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court has given teeth to the
principle of proportionality only to allow the "sky is the limit sentence" and
to quash judicial creating of "lower roof sentences."''  However, the
principle of proportionality is still not strong enough to quash "inflationary
floor sentences" in the form of mandatory custodial terms.
The 1996 sentencing reform also proposed a reciprocal principle of
proportionality between offenders: the principle of imposing similar
sentences for similar crimes and similar offenders (section 718.2(b) of the
Criminal Code). In my article, n1 I contemplated the idea that manslaughter
with a gun or with a knife could justify similar sentences for similar
offenders in similar circumstances or could justify different sentences
because the degree of moral turpitude of the offender could be greater in
the case of manslaughter with a knife. This dimension of the principle of
proportionality is essential for implementing equitable sentencing and for
offering a remedy to unjustified disparity in sentencing. A mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment does not promote fair and equitable
sentencing because it might impose less punishment on the worst
offender."' Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has glorified individualized
9 M(C.A.supra note 42; Shropshire, supra note fit.
11 0 Dumont, upra note S4.
III In lwst,supra note 82, the Supreme Court decided to take prc- .ntcnce custod into account
for minimum sentences in order to remedy the unfairness that could rc.ult if tvo ac¢-.--d with ,mrlar
offences and similar backgrounds are sentenced differently because onlyone is crucd to a minimum
sentence. However, it discarded the constitutional issue ef unfair treatment b;tv.ecn milariffenders
when the question of pre-sentence custody was out of the picture.
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sentencing up to a point that. does not promote fair and equitable
sentencing."
2
The 1996 sentencing reform has also favoured less restrictive
sanctions than imprisonment (sections 718. 2 (d) and (e) of the Criminal
Code). Properly understood, the principle of judicial restraint must be
interpreted as being closely tied to the proportionality principle. In other
words, imprisonment is the most severe form of punishment, while other
punishments are intermediate sanctions (such as probations and
conditional sentences) and other sanctions are more lenient penalties (such
as fines and discharges). In 1996 the principle of proportionality had a
structuring impact on the law of sentencing by allowing the classification of
punishment in terms of degree of severity. Legislative mandatory custodial
sentences are contrary to the spirit of the 1996 sentencing reform and its
structuring principle of proportionality.
The sentencing reform has also pushed the idea of restorative
justice at the periphery of mainstream sentencing in stating at section 718
that:
The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute ... to the maintenance of a
peaceful ... society.
The Supreme Court has pushed this sentencing philosophy a step
further inR. v. Gladuet 3 when interpreting section 718.2 (e) of the Criminal
Code, and has encouraged judges to be creative in sentencing and to look
for alternatives to imprisonment in a thorough fashion, especially for
Aboriginal offenders. However, one can speculate about the changes the
Supreme Court would have made to its discourse on restorative justice if
Mrs. Gladue had carried a gun instead of a knife and had been subjected
to the mandatory custodial sentence of four years.
In any case, restorative justice might be helpful in offering a more
humane approach to punishing criminals and to dealing with the
phenomenon of criminality in society. Rather than asking for a wall-to-wall
repressive system of justice, women should promote this option to prevent
their children and themselves from being victimized by crimes.
In order to change the present demands for harsh sentencing, the
theory of an alternative approach to criminal justice must develop.
Restorative justice is a promising theory that could help change the trend.
112 R. v. McDonnell, [1997] I S.C.R. 948.
113 [19991 1 S.C.R. 688.
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It is based on reconciliation between criminals and society, and on the idea
of peace in society that is deeply upset and disturbed by crime.
Restorative justice redefines crime as an affront to the power of the
state, rather than in terms of conflict or struggle between a criminal and a
victim or the community."' Restorative solutions focus on repairing, to the
extent possible, the harm done. Grounded in community involvement, it
signifies building a community change of heart and giving legitimacy to "in-
society" solutions instead of "out-of-society" punishments. To restore
justice means to live together in peace again after a conflict. Strategic
solutions to restore peace in society may imply giving something back to the
victim or to the injured community, but not necessarily as much as the
victim's retaliators demand. It also may not necessarily involve giving back
to the criminal as much as he or she deserves. A judge could renew the
ancient role of "justice of the peace." The proportionality principle within
the perspective of a restorative justice approach could be seen as operating
with the idea of decreasing the punishment level. Restorative justice means
not only to punish the harm done, but to do something positive for future
peace. In the long run, peace is more valuable to the security of society
than any intrusive protective sentencing. Punishment should not be used as
a commodity-inflicting more pain on criminals should never be
assimilated into the delivery of something good. Consequently, when
punishment is applied, it should always be an occasion for re-examining our
standards of decency and our views on human dignity.
The principle of proportionality is the beam on the scales of justice.
To strengthen this fundamental principle of justice is the task of the
legislator, the Supreme Court, and all the people for whom tolerance,
peace, liberty, and justice are worth promoting.
114 H. Dumont De la Loi C-41 4 la Loi C-55, la Dtermination de la Peme accune Main de Fer
dansun Gant de Velours" in H. Dumont & P. Healy.cds-.ann crDus . m Scntenrm3 (Montreal; Les
tditionsThtmis, 1997) at S3-109. Dumont.supra note 99, K. Pran,"BudngnommuhtySuprart for
Restorative Justice, Principles and Strategies," online: <http iw.;,,realjusttce r,age
building.html> (date accessed: 23 October 2001).
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